

3. Latin American Philosophy as Critical Ontology of the Present: Themes and Motifs for a “Critique of Latin American Reason”

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For Myriam Zapata, *compañera*

“The safari through the unknown, still-to-be-discovered
world in which we live can now begin.”

—Ulrich Beck

When Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno published *The Dialectics of Enlightenment* in 1947, few imagined the decisive influence that this book would have on the form of theorizing the world in times of globalization. In this work, the philosophers from Frankfurt posit that the processes of rationalization project an image of dominion and control over the world that, by virtue of its own dynamic, ends up producing the perverse effect of self-destruction.¹ The increase in rationalization advanced by modernity, instead of eliminating incertitude, fear, and contingencies, ends up *producing* them. This means that the “project of modernity,” in the process of the intensification of its structures, culminates in suppressing itself, in undermining its own normative principles. Behind the backs of social actors—that is, independent of what they might or might not want—modernity has generated the globalization (*mundialización*) of its *undesired consequences*: risk, unknowability of the world, the loss of ontological security, the return to myth, individuation, and hedonism. The disintegration of the project of modernity and the exhaustion of its technologies of control over the social world are not imputable to external enemies of the project itself. For it is not because of a *lack* of social, economic, scientific, and political “development” that the promises of modernity could not be fulfilled, but, on the contrary, *because* of such development.²

According to Ulrich Beck, we live in a *Risikogesellschaft*, a global society of risk in which the properly “modern” categories with which we thought about the world have ceased to be operative.³ When modernity was not yet a “project,” it was still possible to conceptualize the social world in a normative manner, as if we could impose on it our taxonomic imperatives of control, rational organization,

and prevention of eventualities. But the globalization of modernity implies, paradoxically, its cancellation as a project of control over social life and the tempestuous apparition of *contingency* as its engine.⁴ It is not teleological rationality but the collateral and “unforeseen” effects of modernity that have become the engine of politics, economics, and society in an era of globalization. This requires, as Beck shows, that we abandon the binary codes with which modern rationality worked (this or that) in order to advance toward a thought of the interstices, where it would be possible to conceptualize the coexistence of apparently incommensurable times, spaces, and situations (this and the other).⁵ Zygmunt Bauman speaks in this sense of a *thinking of ambivalence*, in which it is assumed that contemporary social life is traversed by plurivalence, dichotomy, perspectivism, and a mix of antithetical elements that do not resolve into a “synthesis.”⁶

In Latin America, cultural studies in the nineties echoed the hybridity and ambivalence of thought. The challenge to think of Latin America from the perspective of a *non-normativistic* vision has led to results that surely seem scandalous to purists of both the right and the left: the great majority of the population in Latin America have acceded to modernity—not through education or the lettered (*letrados*) and ideological programs of the intellectual vanguards, but instead through the new information technologies.⁷ In contrast to what transpired in Europe, the consolidation of cultural modernity in Latin America did not produce films, radio, and television, but instead is precisely *due to them*. In this sense, it would be fitting to talk of a “peripheral modernity” in which different times and logics intermix. The “non-simultaneity of the simultaneous” (Carlos Rincón) that characterizes modernity in Latin America challenges, then, the theoretical frameworks generated by the “project of modernity,” with its accent on social evolution, historical teleology, epistemological humanism, pre-established harmony, and lettered rationality. At the center of socio-cultural analysis now appear identitarian fragmentation, historical discontinuity, cultural heterogeneity, consumption of symbolic commodities, and a proliferation of divergent meanings—that is, all that the modern project had attempted to domesticate and neutralize.

With respect to philosophy, specifically the current that is concerned with reflecting on this slippery object of knowledge called “Latin America,” a similar development is observed. Although in the seventies and eighties Latin American philosophy was presented as a species of “critical conscience” of emancipation (Augusto Salazar Bondy and Enrique Dussel), an axiology of utopian imaginaries (Horacio Cerutti Guldberg and Franz Hinkelammert), a “philosophy of history” oriented to the rational reconstruction of historical memory (Leopoldo Zea and Arturo Roig), or even a hermeneutics of a “collective identity” born of soil and blood (Kusch and Scannone), in the nineties another type of philosophical reflection on “Latin America” began to be sketched out that I will name, following Foucault, *critical ontology of the present*. Here, as in the United States, an anti-normativist position is expressed in the face of present Latin American societies, and in the face of the new contingencies that constitute them. The theoretical adventure is, in any event, similar to that already undertaken by Joaquín Brunner,

García Canclini, Martín-Barbero, Renato Ortiz, Santos, Walter Mignolo, and many others: to formulate the lines of escape from the monopolizing thought model of modernity is equivalent to beginning a safari through the terra incognita of the present that constitutes us as citizens of contemporary times.

To show what this philosophical program consists of, I will proceed in the following manner: starting from the characterization made by Michel Foucault, I will distinguish between two lines of thought and exemplify them with the works of two contemporary Latin American thinkers: the Colombian Roberto Salazar Ramos and the Venezuelan Beatriz González Stephan. My objective is to show how the “critical ontology of the present” has become fruitful for a philosophical reconceptualization of the “Latin American” in times of globalization.

1. WHAT IS “CRITICAL ONTOLOGY OF THE PRESENT”?

In the 1983 essay “What Is Enlightenment?” Michel Foucault describes his philosophical project as an “ontology of the present.” As has been well shown by Richard Bernstein, Foucault’s reflection on his own philosophical investigation, linking it directly to Kant’s thought, constitutes, in reality, an apologia, a response to the critiques he had been receiving to the effect that his project suffered from “fundamental inconsistencies” or lacked any defined philosophical status.⁸ Some years later, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas summarized some of these critiques when he stated that Foucault’s thinking lacked reflection on the “normative grounding” of his own writings, which had led him to fall into “methodological aporias” that Habermas subsumed under the concrete formula of “performative self-contradiction.”⁹ Following, then, Bernstein’s reading, what Foucault was seeking in his text was to respond to objections such as these by showing that his project should be understood as a *critical theory of society*, while at the same time distinguishing himself from the way that the “philosophical discourse of modernity” had been defining what “theory” and “critique” mean.

What, then, is the model of the “critique of society” outlined by Foucault? First of all, it no longer attempts to see the *present* under the aspect of its universal validity and rationality; rather, it considers its radical particularity and dependence on historical factors. In this sense, then, what Foucault seeks is to advance toward a “history of the present” that no longer departs from a normative model of “humanity”—that is, from a *particular* (modern) idea of what it means to be “human,” abstracted from the historical contingencies that gave rise to it. It is a matter, then, of examining the ontological status of the present, foregrounding precisely the historical contingencies and the strategies of power that configured its humanistic claims to universal validity. Foucault recognizes here a new form of approaching philosophically the problem of modernity in which, before discovering the “truth” of its inherent promises (freedom, equality, fraternity), what is sought is to reveal the technologies of domination that aided in its fabrication, as well as the different forms in which such a truth constitutes our contemporary subjectivity.

I will now distinguish two lines of work in this philosophical agenda, and then show how these lines have been developed in Latin America by the thinkers named above. The program of the "critical ontology of the present" entails at least two different tasks:

- a) To contemplate the present as a product of historical contingencies—that is, as a tempestuous configuration in which different social practices are combined. In this context, philosophy should be questioned because of the role played by "truth" in the legitimating of all those practices. For truth does not function solely in its metaphysical and epistemological dimension, but instead is articulated by social *dispositifs* that produce, administer, and distribute it and link it up to cultural or moral ends, or that theatricalize it through academic rituals. To think of risk and contingency as preconditions for globalization entails, then, that the purpose of philosophy no longer be to seek truth as such, but to seek the *political economy of truth*, according to how the rules that configure its discourses appear and disappear.
- b) If "truth is of this world," then philosophy should question the network of *institutions* that modernity generates so that social agents "appropriate" it normatively. For the socialization of knowledge comes linked to *dispositifs* that tend to form profiles of subjectivity, a specific type of human being who can function according to the objectives defined by this "project of modernity." Such *dispositifs* of subjectification control behavior, model bodies, increase productivity, and strengthen the character of citizens. But at the same time, the disciplinary regimentation of what it means to be a "good citizen" clearly establishes a frontier between those "within" and those "outside of" modernity.

2. THE TRUTH REGIMES ON "LO LATINOAMERICANO"

Let us take, then, the first point in the agenda and look at how the ontology of the present has been put in play by a critique of Latin American society in times of globalization. It is necessary to begin by saying that broaching present Latin American society as a tempestuous configuration is a program that is extremely different from that formulated in the seventies by philosophers such as the Mexican Leopoldo Zea, for whom the history of our continent has followed a type of immanent "logic," which he characterized as the incremental "becoming conscious" of its own humanity. For Zea, today's Latin America is the result of a series of historical continuities that can be reconstructed through thought and, concretely, by a "philosophy of history." The mission of this philosophy would be, then, to indicate the way in which Latin Americans have been becoming conscious of their own cultural identity, their own specificity as human beings.¹⁰

But, from the point of view of the ontology of the present, an investigation of the history of Latin American societies acquires an entirely different profile. Here, it is not a question of discovering the way in which "Latin American reason," expressed in the work of its best intellectuals, has "unfolded" historically, but of showing which social mechanisms of discipline have produced both that reason and those intellectuals. That is, it is not a matter of delineating the "logic" of a supposed "Latin American reason," but of highlighting the technologies of social control that generated the psychological profile of an intellectual who feels compelled to unearth the mystery of the "Latin American being," and that have been the *dispositifs* of the power-knowledge from which an object of knowledge called "Latin America" was discursively produced. Before we reflect on the history of discourses in Latin American identity, taken as humanistic objectifications of the lettered conscience, I should mention that the ontology of the present intends to describe the *discontinuous history of production of these discourses*, showing their anchoring in certain *dispositifs* of organization, selection, agency [*agenciamiento*], hierarchization, and legitimation of knowledge. Inasmuch as it investigates genealogically the conditions of possibility of the theoretical discourses on Latin America, the ontology of the present becomes something like a *critique of Latin American reason*.

In his book *Posmodernidad y verdad* [Postmodernity and truth], the Colombian philosopher Roberto Salazar Ramos reflects on the social function of knowledge and, more precisely, the *dispositifs* through which the knowledge of the social world becomes "second nature." Social life would be impossible without the ordering of experience, without the horizon of meaning from which the world is clarified, typified, and explained.¹¹ This means that the *sense* depends not on the cognitive activity of the "subject" but on a series of socially constructed codes that change according to the mode in which the interweaving of relations between social actors is configured or dis-configured. Knowledge is not, then, something "natural"—although our compulsive tendency to seek ontological and epistemological security leads us to believe it is—but something historical that is therefore at the mercy of transgressions, disequilibriums, changes, and mutations. It is from this historically modeled set of norms and social relations, in which we all come into play, that results impossible to interpret nevertheless give sense to our quotidian experience. To speak, think, indicate, perceive, and understand are not activities anchored in a transparent consciousness, but are social constructions, collective sedimentations that explode and fragment with time. In Salazar Ramos's words, "The 'reason for being' of things and their relations are established through a determined system of ordering, a specific series of organizations, and a certain network that weaves and configures their sense and significance. Outside this system, things and their relations would lose sense and significance."¹²

The question asked by Salazar Ramos, then, is the following: How has a specific order of words and things been constructed from which we have been able to generate knowledge on the "what is one's own" and what is "foreign" in Latin America? This concerns, certainly, a question that provokes a certain discomfort in some

parts of the Latin American intellectual community. We have become accustomed to thinking of Latin America as a place of utopia and magical realism, as the site of a project that is autochthonous and presents an alternative project to Western modernity, or as a space of lacks and concealments that have prevented us from reaching the "true modernity" that was achieved by Europe and the United States. But Salazar Ramos's question is directed not at the "being" of Latin America, or at the "normative grounds" of modernity, but at the epistemological-social ordering that has made possible the construction of objects of knowledge such as "Latin America," "the West," "Europe," and "modernity." The question establishes, then, a line of escape with respect to the *episteme* from which some have been formulating the problem: both sides insisted on questioning Latin America's access to modernity, without acknowledging that both categories denote *absolutely nothing* outside the symbolic order from which they were constructed.

This exemplifies the critical function of an ontology of the present: the transparency of an order of knowing, its invisibility and legitimacy, remain destabilized to the extent that they are thrown into question by the way in which they have appeared historically and by the juridical procedures that constitute them. In fact, it is possible to observe or question an order of knowledge only because a displacement has *already* taken place in the structure of social relations that undergirds it. It is the *present* of Latin American societies, marked by the de(re)-territorialization of the local, that has shattered the entire system of ontological and epistemological security from which is articulated the question about Latin America's "entry" into Western modernity.¹³ The philosophical question that is imposed on us by the present is no longer, then, what we should do in order to enter or exit from modernity, but through which practices we have been *invented* as collective agents (Latin Americans, Colombians, Mexicans, Brazilians, etc.) who "enter" or "exit from" something called "modernity."

Salazar Ramos suspects that the essay-like philosophical and sociological meta-narratives on "Latin American identity" in relation with modernity played as keywords so that the groups and individuals functioned and recognized themselves in their social practices, their forms of perception and interaction.¹⁴ These keywords should have made possible a fixed point of reference, a historical memory, a sense of telluric belonging, a "cultural identity" that would serve as support for the great project that the Criollo elites have attempted to impose since the nineteenth century: the construction of the nation. As "imagined communities," Latin American nationalities were produced through a series of social *dispositifs* that organized experiences, thinking, and learning with the goal of preventing uncertainty and ensuring "progress." There thus emerged *Latinamericanismo*, the set of knowledge on "what is one's own," as a cognitive technology used to reorganize social reality. *Latinamericanismo* fulfills the same function as do Pilar Ternera's cards in the story by Garcia Márquez or José Arcadio Buendías's memory machine: to establish an order of meanings that ensures the continuity and regularity of history, which would re-establish the correspondence between words and things. The centennial

project of the nation demanded the construction of a world in which all of its officials—politicians, soldiers, intellectuals [*letrados*—could feel comfortable and secure; a world in which all signs would have their referents, all words their meaning, and all actions a justification. Theoretical discourses on the “national” and the “Latin American” played precisely in accordance with this intent: to transmit to citizens the feeling that they recognized themselves in a fictitious “common history” that synthesized the contradictions of race, gender, class, age, and sexual orientation.

3. THE DISCIPLINARY FORMATION OF THE “NATIONAL SUBJECT”

The critical ontology of the present certainly operates as an archaeology that unearths historical contingencies. Salazar Ramos wonders if the soil of contemporary Latin American societies is formed of the same rocks, reliefs, heights, valleys, and landscapes that modeled the habitat of disciplinary society in the nineteenth century. The stubborn persistence of certain policies of truth on the “national” or “the Latin American” in some academic institutions or the collective imagination would seem to indicate that we still resist the assimilation of globalization as a condition of our present.¹⁵ It is useless to cry and to place flowers on the tomb of historical projects, such as “autochthonism” and “modernization,” that have been superseded by the processes of economic and cultural transnationalization.¹⁶

The Venezuelan thinker Beatriz González Stephan also investigates the archaeological layers that sustain and configure the present of Latin American societies in order to curtail the temptation to flee from that present. But, in contrast to Salazar Ramos, González Stephan emphasizes not the political economy of truth that generates theoretical discourses about the “Latin American,” but the mechanisms of discipline that modeled a specific type of “national citizen.” We arrive, then, at the second item in the theoretical agenda for a critical ontology of the present: to examine the historical *dispositifs* of subjectification that made possible the production of docile and useful bodies for the centennial project of the nation. The creation of Latin American nationalities presupposes the forging of actors—“subjects”—that are the base on which the structures of post-independence modern society are erected. In this context, disciplinary practices, with their techniques of codification of behavior and the programming of quotidian life, play an important role.

González Stephan identifies three disciplinary practices that contributed to the making of Latin American citizens in the nineteenth century: *constitutions*, *manuals of urbanity*, and *grammars of language*. Following the Uruguayan theoretician Angel Rama, Beatriz González verifies that these technologies of subjectification had a common denominator: their legitimacy rested on *writing*. In the nineteenth century, to write was a skill that responded to the necessity to order and establish

the logic of “civilization” and that anticipated the modernizing dream of the Criollo elites. The written word inscribed national laws and identities, designed modernizing programs, and organized an understanding of the world in terms of inclusions and exclusions. For this reason, the foundational project of the nation was carried out through the implementation of institutions legitimated by the word [*letra*] (schools, orphanages, factories, prisons) and of hegemonic discourses (maps, grammars, constitutions, manuals, treatises of hygiene) that regimented the behavior of social actors, established frontiers between some and others, and transmitted to them the certitude of existing within or outside the limits defined by that writerly [*escrituraria*] legality. “Writing,” states González Stephan, “was the decisive exercise of the civilizing practices on which rested the power to domesticate the barbaric and ameliorate custom; under the letter (law, norms, books, manuals, catechism), passions would recoil and violence would be contained.”¹⁷

The formation of the citizen as a “subject of right” was possible only within the framework of a disciplinary writing—in this case, within the space of legality defined by the constitution. The juridical-political function of the constitution was, precisely, to *invent citizenship*—that is, to create a field of homogeneous identities that made viable the modern project of governmentality. The Venezuelan constitution of 1839 states, for instance, that only married males who are over twenty-five years of age, can read and write, own real state, and exercise a profession that generates an annual income of not less than four hundred pesos can be citizens.¹⁸ Thus, acquisition of citizenship was a litmus test (*tamiz*) which only persons whose profile fit the type of subject required by the project of modernity could pass: male, white, head of a household, Catholic, property owner, literate, and heterosexual. Individuals who did not fit these requirements (women, servants, madmen, illiterates, blacks, heretics, slaves, *indios*, homosexuals, dissidents) were left outside the “lettered city” (*ciudad letrada*), relegated to the sphere of illegality, submitted to the punishment and therapy of the very law that excluded them.

If the constitution formally defined a desirable type of modern subjectivity, pedagogy was the great artifice of its materialization. The school became a space of internment where the type of subject that the “regulative ideals” of the constitution clamored for was formed. What was sought was to interject a discipline on the mind and body that enabled the person to be “useful to the fatherland.” Children’s behavior was to be regulated and watched over, submitted to the acquisition of knowledge, capacities, habits, values, cultural models and styles of life that would allow them to take a “productive” role in society. But it is not toward the school as an “institution of sequestering” that Beatriz González directs her reflections, but toward the disciplinary function of certain pedagogical technologies, such as the manuals of urbanity, and in particular the famous one by Carreño published in 1854. The manual functioned within the sphere of authority revealed by the book as an attempt to regulate and constrict instincts, control the movements of the body, and domesticate every type of sensibility deemed “barbarous.”¹⁹ No manuals were written on how to be a good farmer, Indian, black man, or gaucho, since all of these types of human beings were seen as belonging to the sphere of the bar-

barian. The manuals were written to form a “good citizen” who would be part of the *civitas*, the legal space wherein dwelt the epistemological, moral, and aesthetic subjects that needed modernity. For this reason, Carreño’s manual notes that “without more or less perfect observance of these rules, according to the degree of *civilization* of each country . . . there would be no way to cultivate sociality, which is the principle of the conservation and the *progress* of peoples [*pueblos*] and the existence of every *well-ordered* society.”²⁰

The manuals of urbanity became the new bible that indicated to the citizen what his behavior ought to be in the different situations of life, for on faithful obedience to such norms would depend his greater or lesser success in the *civitas terrena*, the material kingdom of civilization. The entrance to the banquet of modernity demanded the fulfillment of a normative cookbook that distinguished the members of a new urban class that began to emerge in all of Latin America during the second half of the nineteenth century. The “we” to whom the manual makes reference is, then, the bourgeois citizen, the same one at whom the republican constitutions were aimed;²¹ the one who knew how to speak, eat, use cutlery, blow his nose, deal with servants, and behave in society. He was the subject who knew perfectly “the theater of etiquette, the rigidity of presentation, the mask of contention.”²² In this sense, the observations of González Stephan coincide with those of Max Weber and Norbert Elias, for whom the constitution of the modern subject went hand in hand with the demand for self-control and repression of the instincts, with the goal of making social difference more visible. The “process of civilization” dragged in its wake a rise in the threshold of shame, because it was necessary to differentiate clearly between all the social strata that did not belong to the sphere of the urban, the *civitas* that Latin American intellectuals such as Sarmiento had identified as the paradigm of modernity.²³ “Urbanity” and “civic education” played, then, as pedagogical taxonomies that separated the vest from the poncho, the elegant from shoddiness, the capital from the provinces, the republic from the colony, civilization from barbarism.

The grammars of language also played a fundamental role in this taxonomic process. González Stephan mentions in particular *Gramática de la Lengua Castellana destinada al uso de los americanos* (Grammar of the Castilian language for the use of Americans) published by Andrés Bello in 1847. The project of construction of the nation required linguistic stabilization for the adequate implementation of laws and also to facilitate commercial transactions. There existed, then, a direct relationship between language and citizenship, between grammars and manuals of urbanity. In any event, the project concerned the creation of a *homo economicus*, the patriarchal subject in charge of fomenting and carrying out the modernization of the republic. From the normativity of the letter, grammars sought to generate a culture of “speaking well” (*buen decir*) to the end of preventing “the vicious practices of popular speech” and the grotesque barbarisms of the plebe.²⁴ Thus, we have a disciplinary practice in which were reflected contradictions that ended up sundering the project of modernity: to establish the conditions for “freedom” and “order” entailed submission of the instincts, suppression of spontaneity, control of

differences. In order to be civilized, to become part of modernity, to be Colombian, Brazilian, or Venezuelan citizens, individuals not only had to behave correctly and know how to read and write, but also had to make their language conform to a whole series of norms. Submission to order and norm led the individual to substitute the heterogeneous and spontaneous flow of the vital with adoption of a *continuum* arbitrarily constituted through the letter.

To examine how the mechanisms of “ontological security” proper to modernity are established in our midst: this is the intent of a critical ontology of the present as exemplified by Roberto Salazar Ramos and Beatriz González Stephan. Both have shown that the projects of modernization of Latin American societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries led to a series of *dispositifs* oriented to the rational control of human life. If social control of contingencies, without submission of the body and mind to the discipline of work and an education in the customs were impossible, it would be impossible to reach the level of development, prosperity, humanization, and progress that seem so evident in industrialized nations. As it was in Europe, the project of modernity in Latin America was directly linked to the juridical-political construction of national states. As much here as there, modernity was a “project” because the rational control of contingencies had to be exercised under a central authority, which was in fact the nation-state.

But this type of deconstructive critique is not simply a historiographical exercise. It is, rather, an attempt to answer the question, Who are we Latin Americans *today*, in times of globalization? If Salazar Ramos and González Stephan direct their gaze toward the archaeological layers of the nineteenth century, it is because they know that the properly *modern dispositifs* of social control have been overtaken by their own dynamics and given rise to a phenomenon that we call “globalization.” If the project of modernity requires the formation of structures that social actors *reproduce*, globalization opens the bars of the “iron cage” and projects the image of structures that the actors themselves *transform*. The modern dialectics between subject and structure loses thrust and begins to “weaken”—as Vattimo would put it—in such a way that structures become the object of processes of action and social change. There is a simple reason for this: globalization is not a homogeneous structure, nor is it a “project”; it is the tempestuous result of the crisis of modernity as the project of structuring social subjects. Modernity ceases to be operative as a “project” when the political, social, and cultural life of human beings is uncoupled from the nation-state and begins to be configured by transnational processes.²⁵ Thus, all those elements that in the period of modernity formed a “project” coordinated by the state are now subject to dispersion, or *globalization*. We are witness, then, to the transition from modernity’s rational project to the global disorder of world-modernity, with all of its risks and possibilities. To give an account of these risks and possibilities, to think in the interstices opened up by the crisis of the modern project—such is the task of a critical ontology of the present.

NOTES

1. Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (London: Verso, 1979 [1947]).
2. See Anthony Giddens, "Living in a Post-Traditional Society," in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens, and Scott Lash, *Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Aesthetics in the Modern Social Order* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1994), 56–109.
3. See Ulrich Beck, *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986). See also Niklas Luhmann, *Risk: A Sociological Theory* (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1993).
4. On the end of modernity as a "project," see Santiago Castro-Gómez, "The World Is No Longer Wide but Continues Being Alien: The End of Modernity and Transformations of Cultures in Times of Globalization," in Mario Saenz, ed., *Globalization and Latin American Thought* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
5. See U. Beck, "Teoría de la modernización reflexiva," in J. Beriain, ed., *Las consecuencias perversas de la modernidad. Modernidad, riesgo y contingencia* (Barcelona: Anthropos, 1996), 223ff; see also Martin Albrow, *Abschied vom Nationalstaat. Staat und Gesellschaft im globalen Zeitalter* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998).
6. Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence* (London: Polity, 1991); see also idem, *Intimations of Postmodernity* (London: Routledge, 1992).
7. See J. Martín-Barbero, *De los medios a las mediaciones. Comunicación, cultural y hegemonía* (Barcelona: Ediciones Gili, 1991); see also J. J. Brunner, *América Latina: cultura y modernidad* (Mexico City: Grijaldo, 1996).
8. Richard Bernstein, "Foucault: Critique as a Philosophical Ethos," in Michael Kelly, ed., *Critique and Power. Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994), 211–241.
9. Jürgen Habermas, "The Critique of Reason as an Unmasking of the Human Sciences: Michel Foucault," in J. Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1987), 238–265.
10. I have amply dealt with the exposition and critique of Latin American philosophy of history in chapter 4 of my book *Crítica de la razón latinoamericana* (Barcelona: Puvill libros, 1996).
11. Roberto Salazar Ramos, *Posmodernidad y verdad. Algunos metarelatos en la constitución del saber* (Bogotá: Ediciones USTA, 1994), 65ff.
12. *Ibid.*, 70.
13. On the problem of de(re)territorialization in Latin America see Santiago Castro-Gómez and Eduardo Mendieta, "La translocalización discursiva de 'Latinoamérica,' en tiempos de globalización," in S. Castro-Gómez and Eduardo Mendieta, eds., *Teorías sin disciplina. Latinoamericanismo, poscolonialidad y globalización en debate* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 1998), 5–30.
14. R. Salazar Ramos, "Los grandes meta-relatos en la interpretación de la historia latinoamericana," in *Ponencias VII Congreso Internacional de Filosofía Latinoamericana* (Bogotá: Universidad Santo Tomás, 1993), 63–93.
15. Concerning how this "metaphysics of the Latin American" still constitutes us today, see Santiago Castro-Gómez, "Latinamericanismo, modernidad, globalización. Prolegómenos a una crítica poscolonial de la razón," in S. Castro-Gómez and E. Mendieta, *Teorías sin disciplina*, 169–205.

16. See R. Salazar Ramos, "Notas para una postfilosofía latinoamericana" (forthcoming).
17. Beatriz González Stephan, "Economías fundacionales. Diseño del cuerpo ciudadano," in B. González Stephan, ed., *Cultura y tercer mundo. Nuevas identidades y ciudadanías* (Caracas: Editorial Nueva Sociedad, 1996), 20.
18. *Ibid.*, 31.
19. Beatriz González Stephan, "Modernización y disciplinamiento. La formación del ciudadano: del espacio público y privado," in B. González Stephan, J. Lasarte, G. Montaldo, and M. J. Daroqui, eds., *Esplendores y miserias del siglo XIX. Cultura y sociedad en América Latina* (Caracas: Monte Avila Editores, 1995), 431-455.
20. *Ibid.*, 436.
21. It is not a coincidence that in 1855 the national congress of Venezuela agreed to the use of Carreño's manual in schools.
22. Stephan, "Modernización," 439.
23. See D. F. Sarmiento, *Facundo o civilización* (Caracas: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 1985).
24. B. González Stephan, "Economías fundacionales," 29.
25. See Martin Albrow, *Abschied vom Nationalstaat*, 87ff.